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Abstract: In response to the recent troubled history of risk-related technological 
development in Europe, one institutional reaction has been to advocate public 
deliberation as a means of achieving broad societal consensus over socio-scientific 
futures. We focus on ‘consensusing’ and the expectation of consensus, and consider 
both their roots and their performative consequences. We argue that consensus 
should be seen not simply as the absence of disagreement but as a particular political 
and ideological formation. We consider and explore the Danish model based on the 
folkelig concept of the common good, before turning to the wider European movement 
towards consensus-building. As presented here, consensusing becomes a focus for 
political contestation but also for nation- and institution-building. Rather than 
evaluating deliberation solely in terms of its short-term instrumental effects, 
consensusing should also be understood as performative of national and inter-national 
identity. 
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In 2004, two of the UK’s leading scientific institutions, the Royal Society (RS) and the 
Royal Academy of Engineering (RAE), jointly published a report on the development and 
future use of nanoscience and nanotechnologies. In keeping with the ‘new’ mode of 
scientific governance (Irwin, 2006), authorship of the report extended beyond technical 
and industrial experts so as to incorporate an environmentalist, a social scientist and a 
consumer champion. The report itself stressed the need for 'stakeholder and public 
dialogue' and highlighted the 'key requirements that any dialogue process … must meet 
and which we recommend' (RS/RAE, 2004: 65). Many of these requirements are very 
familiar within discussions of European scientific governance: the necessity for early 
dialogue and engagement, a call for clarity about debate objectives, commitment that the 
outcomes will be taken seriously, integration with other processes of technology 
development, and proper resourcing. The report specifically argued that 'the upstream 
nature of most nanotechnologies means that there is an opportunity to generate a 
 2 
constructive and proactive debate about the future of the technology now, before deeply 
entrenched or polarized positions appear' (RS/RAE, 2004: 67). 
At the core of this paper is an analytical and empirical focus on the assumption that 
dialogue will in some way minimize social division and controversy. This assumption can 
be identified within various policy initiatives dealing with nanotechnology (US Congress, 
2003; Kearnes et al. 2006; Wilsdon & Willis, 2004) but also topics such as stem cell 
research (Bhattachary, 2008; see also Horst, 2008), genetically modified foods (AEBC, 
2003) civil nuclear power (NWMO, 2009) and synthetic biology (Balmer & Martin, 2008). 
More specifically, this British nano report illustrates how the widespread enthusiasm for 
deliberation and public dialogue is closely coupled to an expectation that consensus – or 
something similar – about the future development of science and technology will follow. 
The EU-funded STAGE network researching scientific governance in Europe identified this 
instrumental expectation within many contemporary policy-statements (Hagendijk et al. 
2005; Hagendijk & Irwin, 2006; Horst et al. 2007). STAGE research also illustrated how the 
‘deliberation leading to consensus’ formulation is usually built upon an awareness of public 
scepticism or unease with specific areas of scientific and/or technological development. 
This public reaction is presented as a negative characteristic – as a problem, a potential 
resistance, a barrier or an impediment. Public deliberation and engagement are then 
advocated as a way of changing (or fixing) this perceived scepticism. Inspired by criticism 
of the deficit-model and more positive notions of ‘upstream engagement’, deliberation and 
public involvement have thus come to be defined within Western Europe in particular as a 
(possibly the) solution to anticipated controversy and divisiveness.  
Just as Marx famously devoted many more words to the self-destructive character of 
capitalism than to the nature of communism, policy documents about public engagement 
in the governance of science and technology typically say little (and certainly nothing in 
detail) about their preferred socio-scientific vision of the future. Rather, they 
characteristically provide a negative definition – that is, a description of what they wish to 
avoid (often by explicit or implicit reference to what has gone before: animal rights 
activism, societal reactions to GM foods, anti-nuclear protests). They advocate public 
deliberation and engagement as a tool for avoiding or fixing controversies, but do not 
describe how this mechanism is supposed to work or define the consensual social climate 
which is supposed to be the outcome of deliberation. Tony Blair may have been precise 
when, in a speech to the Royal Society in 2002, he stated that the intention was 'to be a 
nation at ease with radical knowledge' (Blair, 2002). For Blair, this would involve a 
'pragmatic, evidence-based approach to new opportunities' sharply contrasted with 'a path 
of timidity in the face of the unknown'. In a wider sense, ‘ease’ might be presented, 
variously, as an absence of conflict, an acceptance that there is little point in resistance, a 
general subscription to the ways things are going, or even a full-blown national agreement 
about a current issue.  In this paper, however, we are less interested in pinning down 
consensus as a concept – or in either proclaiming or condemning it – than in exploring it 
as a phenomenon in itself and a source of performativity (Law & Urry, 2004). In order to 
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capture this sense of process and construction, we will refer to the goal of ‘being at ease’ 
as operating in the realm of consensus-thinking, which we present as one element within 
the wider phenomenon of  ‘consensusing’ - the active process of seeking and expecting 
societal consensus. 
On this basis, we aim to question contemporary ‘consensusing’ with regard to scientific 
and technologically-related futures – but not necessarily to reject it. We are more 
interested in asking: what does ‘consensusing’ do? Where does it lead us – in practical as 
well as theoretical terms? By considering it as a specific ideological formation, we aim to 
explore both the contemporary appeal of consensusing with regard to science and 
technology and also its special relationship to deliberation and engagement.  As part of 
this discussion, we shall argue that engagement exercises should not be judged solely in 
terms of their policy impact, nor in terms of whether they change the immediate agenda or 
construct new areas of agreement. Instead, we are interested in exploring the wider 
performative character of such forms of talk and action: what they bring into being and how 
they are productive (but also reflective) of social and institutional arrangements. 
In order to explore both the performativity of consensus and the roots of consensusing, we 
will consider Denmark as an often-proclaimed (indeed paradigmatic) case of this mode of 
thought and action. Certainly, Denmark – and especially its development of ‘consensus 
conferences’ – features prominently (and positively) in the Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) literature on deliberation and engagement. The point of the upcoming 
Danish excursion, however, is not (as is usually the case) to present an inspirational ideal-
type. Instead, we will consider consensusing in its socio-political context and the close 
historical relationship between consensus-seeking and nation-building. We will also 
present consensusing as involving substantially more than the absence of antagonism. In 
the latter sections of this paper, we consider some of the wider consequences of our 
analysis. Our intention here is not to document, or provide concrete evidence for, the wider 
impacts and implications of the Danish model. Nor are we interested in developing a 
‘Denmark conquers the world’ scenario. Instead, we have the more modest aim of 
exploring some examples of consensusing at a wider European level and considering the 
questions this raises for democratic debate within scientific governance.  
 
A Brief Introduction to Consensusing 
It is impossible in this paper to do justice to the rich academic history of consensus and 
consensus-thinking, but we can sketch a few positions that constitute a general conceptual 
landscape. In the following, we will pay special attention to the implications for STS 
scholarship. It must nevertheless be acknowledged that the dominant academic approach 
to consensusing has developed in political philosophy around the idea that it is possible to 
elicit or identify a general set of norms or values to which a given community will 
unanimously subscribe. As a prominent example, Jürgen Habermas’s notion of 
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communicative action rests upon the ideal that if all participants in a speech situation act 
according to a communicative rationality, then the better argument will be able to provide 
robust solutions to common problems (Habermas, 1991, 1984). Habermas, however, 
should not be seen in intellectual isolation, as his work represents one strand within wider 
discussions of reinvigorating democracy through deliberative engagement (see notably 
Rawls, 1993; Elster, 1998; and Dryzek, 2006). 
The notion that consensual solutions can be achieved through dialogue has been highly 
influential in debates about the need for deliberative procedures within the governance of 
science and technology (see, for example, Joss & Durant, 1995; Einsiedel et al, 2001; 
Fischer, 1999; Joss, 2002). However, the merits of such an ideal in the face of complex 
and controversial topics have also been discussed extensively. As Holt argues in a 
stimulating reflection on risk management, the solutions are heavily dependent on the 
perception of the problem: 
Culturally, tame problems enjoy consensus: everybody pretty well agrees why 
something needs to be done and the right way to go about doing it. There are 
countless examples of tame problems, and solving them has been the great 
forte of science for several hundred years. Owing in large part to such 
successes, they remain the ideal for many social scientists as well as for 
managers and administrators. (Holt, 2004: 258) 
In Holt’s terminology, the general difficulty for consensus-building arises when problems 
which initially appear ‘tame’ to those seeking to manage risks become messes, wicked 
problems or even wicked messes – and when ‘linear, self-referential dialogue’ must give 
way to a sense that both the epistemology and ontology of a problem are variable. Thus, it 
might be possible to build a consensus around GM foods if the problem were well-defined 
(perhaps as a matter of establishing an acceptable level of risk), the analytical methods 
agreed (environmental risk assessment), the solutions clear (tight regulation, control and 
oversight) and all stakeholders shared a single perspective (based for example on 
unproblematic scientific evidence). But what if there are multiple problem definitions, the 
methods are open to contention and the solutions are variable and disputed? What if there 
are 'unknown unknowns' that suggest 'chronic conditions of ignorance and lack of capacity 
to imagine future eventualities ("scientific" or "social") that may arise from a given 
technology' (Grove-White, 2001: 471)?   
This is not necessarily a critique of the notion of a communicative rationality. But it does 
emphasise that it is difficult (or even impossible) to establish in practice the precise 
conditions of consensusing as specified in normative political philosophy (see also Bora & 
Hausendorf, 2006; Lezaun & Soneryd, 2007). Despite these problems, we can identify in 
Habermasian political philosophy a type of consensus-thinking which aims to build on the 
pervasive power of the ‘better argument’. This way of thinking has certainly been highly 
influential in the propagation of deliberation and engagement found in certain policy-
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oriented parts of the STS literature (Sclove, 1995; Fischer, 2000, Durant, 1999; Joss & 
Brownlea, 1999). STS studies have often encouraged the idea that deliberation will lead to 
policy decisions that are both better and more widely accepted in society. In this, some 
STS scholars seem to be reflecting the classic enlightenment notion that, if only we could 
think things through openly, properly and thoroughly, then a rational solution will be found. 
Meanwhile, other strands within STS thinking offer a perhaps more sophisticated 
perspective on notions of consensus: 'the idea that consensus is central to participatory 
exercises – as expressed in consensus conferences – should be rejected. Indeed, we 
should ask why consensus should be a better input for policy making than identifying the 
central areas where authentic disagreement, or even dislocation remain' (Felt & Wynne, 
2007: 61).  
In reaction to the politico-philosophical ideal of consensus, but also to the widespread use 
of consensus talk in government reports and statements, Chantal Mouffe (1993, 2000) has 
adopted a critical perspective on the nature of dialogue, challenging notions of deliberative 
democracy and related attempts to negate what she presents as the inherently conflictual 
nature of democratic politics. Sceptical of moves to establish a ‘consensus of the centre’ 
which counterposes itself to the ‘forces of conservatism’ (a contrast which is closely 
paralleled by Blair’s presentation of a ‘nation at ease with radical knowledge’ under 
challenge from anti-science), Mouffe calls instead for an ‘agonistic pluralism’ which 
acknowledges the unavoidability of antagonism and the unattainability of conflict 
resolution.  
In a related line of argument, Brian Wynne, one of the social scientists most often 
associated with the idea of upstream engagement, has criticized the 'otherwise admirable' 
nanotechnologies report discussed briefly above in order to argue that the nature of the 
move upstream has 'frequently been misunderstood'. Thus, the RS/RAE (2004) report 
'describes the potential role of upstream engagement in anticipating sensitive issues, 
despite our emphasis that upstream forms of public engagement are emphatically not 
about earlier prediction (and subsequent management) of impacts' (Wynne, 2006: 73).  
For Wynne, upstream engagement is less an instrumental method of avoiding subsequent 
conflict than a means of problematising and challenging what he terms 'unacknowledged 
social and cultural dimensions of scientific knowledge' (p. 72).  
Both Mouffe and Wynne, therefore, point to what they see as the inherent dangers of 
consensusing leading to the development of reductionist and instrumentally-oriented 
frameworks. Rather than ‘opening-up’ (Stirling, 1999) the more complex and multi-layered 
character of public and institutional meanings, identities and understandings, 
consensusing can lead to the creation of uni-dimensional or ‘false’ consensus. We could 
describe this (with apologies to Marx) as the creation of ‘false consensusness’, or, to be 
more consistent, forms of consensusing which are inauthentic or overtly ideological in 
character. While Mouffe appears to suggest that all consensusing in the current social 
structure leads to a false consensus, an alternative, generally implicit, position within STS 
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points to specific forms of false consensus but holds open the possibility of ‘true’ 
consensus — if only the stakeholders are properly engaged, the experts appropriately 
reflexive, the policy makers sufficiently open to alternative value frameworks, and the like. 
Other traditions within STS suggest alternative approaches to consensus formation. One 
of the most important of these develops upon the study of boundary work, which is not 
primarily focused on consensus as such, but on the mediation, negotiation and 
management of boundaries or entities (Gieryn, 1995; Kelly 2003). In this vein, 
Habermasian ideals and accusations of false consensusing are replaced with the more 
neutral and empirically-oriented language of ‘closure’. Closure represents a point of 
stabilisation in the political process where, typically, certain arguments and forms of 
evidence are ruled ‘in’ and others ‘out’. Often, as demonstrated in the work of Sheila 
Jasanoff (2005), what gets defined ‘out’ are wider social and ethical commentaries, while a 
narrower form of technical expertise gets defined ‘in’. In this way, the definition of good 
science can also represent the dividing line between legitimate and illegitimate claims. 
Closure designates a situation in which there is no explicit challenging of policy goals and 
instruments. Oppositional groups are ‘at ease’ in the very particular sense that their 
arguments and concerns can no longer gain traction within the public sphere, even if this 
also leads to the kinds of criticisms and accusations which are so characteristic of 
engagement exercises.  
The concept of boundary work is a stimulus to empirical exploration and as such 
represents an important move away from the normative debate sparked by the idea of 
deliberative democracy. Our approach in this paper draws on the empirical imperative, but 
focuses on the very expectation of consensus as a legitimate policy goal. We therefore do 
not focus on how consensus or closure is or is not achieved in a specific area of 
innovation, but rather on consensusing as an expectation and ideal with practical 
consequences.  
In making this analytical move, it is important to stress that all the above perspectives add 
to the understanding of what it would mean to be ‘a nation at ease’. The point of this paper 
is not to decide in favour of either consensus as the outcome of the ‘power of the better 
argument’ or as a manifestation of false consensus, but rather to open consensusing itself 
up to critical scrutiny. We will present the pursuit of consensus as a specific ideological 
and cultural formation, and as an expectation. This expectation (and the thinking behind it) 
can therefore be productive and performative even if the outcomes of deliberative 
engagements are often deemed disappointing. In order to make these general points we 





Denmark: Land of Consensus  
When the British House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology assigned 
itself the task of producing a report on 'Science and Society' (House of Lords, 2000) there 
were two overseas locations worth visiting. The first – the United States – was hardly 
unexpected given the scale of that nation’s investment in science and technology. The 
second would be a surprise to anyone unfamiliar with contemporary initiatives in science 
and democracy, including many in Denmark. However, and as the eventual report 
summarised the visit: 
Denmark… has evolved institutions to give effect to a society whose political 
philosophy is to seek consensus rather than confrontation… Denmark’s 
bodies such as the Danish Board of Technology, the Danish Council of Ethics, 
and the Central Scientific and Ethical Committee offer reassurance and, to 
some extent, involvement to a public which tends to be suspicious of both 
government and experts, including scientists. (House of Lords, 2000: 82) 
These Danish institutions were established on the basis of widespread discussion and 
controversy in the 1980s surrounding the development of bio- and information technology. 
In 1986, the internationally renowned (almost talismanic for those committed to science 
and democracy) Danish Board of Technology was founded (See <www.tekno.dk>). The 
Board is not an expert panel. Instead, it is designed to create and stimulate different 
processes of technology assessment, including what is referred to in Denmark as ‘broad 
public debate’. The Board employs a variety of methods, but is best known internationally 
for its participatory forms – and especially participatory consensus conferences. In such a 
conference, a panel of lay people solicits expert opinions on a particular topic of 
technological controversy (Andersen & Jæger, 1999; Blok, 2007; Jensen, 2005). On this 
basis, it formulates a consensus report on how society should or should not proceed with 
the regulation and exploitation of the technology in question.  
The second institution mentioned above, the Council of Ethics, was established in 1987 as 
an advisory body in relation to new health-care technologies (see <www.etiskraad.dk>). 
This body is designed as an expert committee, which should aim to deliver consensus-
based policy advice, but it is explicitly stated in its legislative foundation that the Council 
also has an obligation to generate public debate. Throughout its history, the Council has 
arranged numerous open meetings, conferences, web-forums and other engagement 
activities to elicit public debate and opinion formation about new biotechnologies. 
Certainly, the Council’s members have participated regularly in public meetings and mass 
mediated debate. The third body, the Central Scientific and Ethical Committee, serves to 
oversee ethical standards in the use of human subjects in scientific research projects. In 
1992 this body was changed from a professional and voluntary to a legal and statutory 
organisation, but it has not been as publically visible as the other two. 
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Both the Board of Technology and the Council of Ethics have been regularly called upon 
for input to various policy-processes. The Lords Select Committee has not been alone in 
offering praise to the Danish governance of science and technology.  Internationally, 
consensus conferences have attracted substantial scholarly attention as a key example of 
deliberative democracy in the governance of science and technology (see, for example, 
Joss & Durant, 1995; Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). In terms of external influence, one US web-
site (Loka Institute, n.d.) lists 18 countries as having engaged in 'Danish-style, citizen-
based deliberative "consensus conferences" on science and technology policy worldwide'. 
More widely, deliberative democracy in Denmark has attracted numerous positive 
international evaluations: 'in the "consensus conferences" held in Denmark, findings are 
incorporated into parliamentary discussion as a matter of routine...they have directly 
influenced parliamentary decisions' (Giddens, 2007: 193).  
Nevertheless, looking more closely at Danish practice, it is quite difficult to point to any 
explicit influence of these engagement activities on actual decision-making in Denmark. 
Despite external commentaries, it is very hard to find examples of consensus conference 
recommendations which have made their way directly into public policy.1 Simultaneously, 
the Council of Ethics has struggled to fulfil the ideal of consensus-expectation. Contrary to 
its explicit goal, it has turned out to be very challenging for Council members to reach 
consensus on controversial issues and many of their policy recommendations have 
highlighted areas of dissent as well as agreement. Even when the Council members have 
been able to reach agreement on policy recommendations, these have most commonly 
been disregarded by policy makers in the legislative process (Koch & Horst, 2007).  
Furthermore, both the Board of Technology and the Council of Ethics have suffered 
substantial funding cuts over the past ten years. They also consider that their activities 
have received diminished attention with regard to policy formulation and public debate. 
Indeed, the Board of Technology was threatened with closure in 2002. Although it 
managed to survive, its funding has been reduced. At the time of writing, the most recent 
consensus conference organised by the Board took place in 2005, and was part of a 
larger, externally-funded European initiative. Although the Board has continued to work 
with a sophisticated catalogue of techniques suitable for different kinds of consultation with 
both experts and publics, currently there are no plans for new consensus conferences.  
Given this rather gloomy context for deliberation, it is tempting to conclude that the 
widespread praise of the Danish model of governance is based on nothing more than a 
myth or fairy tale. We would argue firmly against this proposition – and for reasons which 
take us to the heart of our discussion of consensusing. The significance of these 
institutions should not be solely found in their specific input to policy processes, but also in 
the fact that they embody an important ideal that has played a central role in the shaping 
of Danish national identity and the functioning of Danish society.  
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The Roots of Consensus Thinking 
In making its point about the pursuit of consensus rather than confrontation, the House of 
Lords committee was broadly in keeping with one common observation about Danish 
culture – an observation that retains persuasive power despite more recent divisive 
political discussions (notably, around issues of immigration and what has become known 
as ‘Cartoongate’).2 As Knud Jespersen has loosely characterized this outsider’s view of 
the country, 'Denmark is a small, insignificant, comfortable country, peopled by a 
homogeneous tribe whose members more or less all know each other, and even the most 
controversial political issues are resolved peaceably with the tacit understanding that we 
will still all be here afterwards' (Jespersen, 2004: 7).  
To understand this consensus-oriented view of Danish culture, it is necessary to glance 
back to the formation of the small Danish nation-state in the nineteenth century, and 
particularly to the teachings of priest, poet and politician N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-1872). 
Before we continue the argument, it should be emphasised that we present Grundtvig here 
as a convenient device for summarizing a huge network of influences, rather than as a 
figure who literally changed the course of an entire country. Drawing broadly on one of the 
most important lessons from STS scholarship, we do not mean to imply that Grundtvigian 
ideas have, in isolation, determined the course of Danish culture and political institutions. 
Rather, we would point to a ‘co-evolution’ (or ‘co-production’: Jasanoff, 2004) of this 
political philosophy and the Danish nation state.  
Although the Grundtvigian influence is broad, we have chosen to concentrate on his 
advocacy of a folkelig democracy and the close relationship between this and the Danish 
notion of consensus politics. The term folkelig is hard to translate, but the dictionary 
suggests a range of terms including ‘popular’, ‘national’, ‘simple’, ‘unassuming’, ‘common’ 
and ‘folksy’. Grundtvig was an active proponent of the creation of a nation state in which 
the Danish people would be united in a common history and a common mother tongue 
(Korsgaard, 2004). ‘The people’, however, were not simply the masses of Danish peasants 
and workers. Instead, the Danes had to be shaped as a people through enlightenment and 
self-reflexivity. For this purpose, he devised a completely new institution, the ‘folk high 
schools’, whose task was education in national knowledge about practical human life. 
Grundtvig envisioned the folk high schools as a ‘school for life’ in contrast to the 
universities which he described as focused on ‘dead’ knowledge and the individual rather 
than the greater collectivity (Knudsen, 2001:99-105). He was fiercely opposed to narrowly 
didactic or one-way teaching, and envisioned folk high schools as open and anti-
authoritarian institutions dedicated to the achievement of educational dialogue and the 
power of ‘the living word’ (Korsgaard, 2004:225-27).  
The point of educational enlightenment was not to create self-serving or competitive 
individuals, but rather a folkelig society through a common understanding of the shared 
human life of the nation. Grundtvig had an explicitly anti-elitist perception of the national 
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community (Knudsen, 2001:104). In one of his songs an often-cited line reads: 'And the 
sun rises with the farmer, not at all with the learned' (Grundtvig, 1839).3 Ordinary folk (and 
in particular farmers) were seen as better connected with the knowledge of practical life 
than learned people in universities. For Grundtvig, common deliberation was the locus of a 
shared understanding of mutual history, and a shared sense of the common good.  
It is usually argued that the concept of folkelig has been hugely influential in the formation 
of Danish democracy and within Danish political culture more generally (see for example 
Korsgaard, 2004). The concept in turn builds upon a particular construction of the Danish 
people as united around key notions of 'tolerance, openness and liberal-mindedness' with 
enlightenment and committed dialogue presented as the means to achieving those ideals 
(Jespersen, 2004: 110). As Jespersen (2004: 105) describes it: 'the intent was no less 
than to transform the inarticulate masses into responsible and articulate citizens in the new 
democratic society which was slowly taking shape.' Ove Kaj Pedersen has made a similar 
point in rather different terms: 'Being a small land with a long history of lost wars and 
territories creating a sense of national vulnerability explains why the national identity has 
developed to become relatively homogeneous and the political system has evolved to be 
based on a culture of negotiation and compromise rather than competition and conflict' 
(Pedersen, 2006: 234). 
Put in crude summary form, the Danish ‘consensual’ approach can be expressed as an 
obligation to involve all members of society in national decision-making and to view the 
‘popular’ not in derogatory or patronising terms (as in the British meaning of ‘popular 
culture’ or ‘popular opinion’), but as a positive mixture of 'popularity, popular democracy, 
folksiness, simplicity, unassuming warmth and ease and so on!' (Jespersen, 2004: 108). In 
that way, what the Lords committee was translating as a Danish propensity to ‘seek 
consensus rather than confrontation’ may more accurately be seen as an ideal about 
pursuing the common good: the perspective of the whole rather than narrow self-interest 
or individual idiosyncrasy. In this pursuit, the layperson has a very particular role as the 
locus of ‘living’ knowledge about the community. Any ‘true’ consensusing should therefore 
build upon contributions from the laypeople.  
The folkelig notion was to be crucial in the anti-authoritarian, left-wing critique of science 
and technology which developed in Denmark from the late 1960s. A large part of these 
oppositional arguments drew upon a challenge to modernity, industrialisation, capitalist 
exploitation and – not least – hierarchical antagonism. As one writer of the time put it: 
'Grundtvig’s fight for the people against any form of hierarchy made him establish 
“forskning for folket” [research for the people]. His most important scientific discovery [sic.] 
is “the living word”, which he never tired of repeating. It is on dialogue that a public 
community, in opposition to thousands of years of hierarchical class society, can be built 
and developed' (Larsen, 1983: 93). Scientific hierarchies were described as propagating 
one-dimensional knowledge and therefore as cut off from the practical knowledge of how 
to live together in a community (Auken, 1983; Lauth, 1985; Meyer, 1985; Wilhjelm, 1984). 
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Against the one-dimensional bias of experts, many critics proposed the ‘common person’ 
as the locus for viable solutions in the community (Lund & Horst, 1999). Lay people were 
thus presented as the only unbiased actors within discussions of science and technology. 
Only they could adopt the perspective of Danish society as a whole (Horst, 2003).  
It is within this discursive framework that the folkelig institutions of science and technology 
governance in Denmark were devised. They embody the notion of public debate as a 
crucial vehicle for the creation of legitimate and viable solutions to technological and social 
controversies. Rather than being simple means of consensus-creation (or institutional fixes 
for perceived societal problems), they might be viewed as manifestations and illustrations 
of how the notion of consensus has been influential in forming national identity in 
Denmark. Following from this, we would suggest that the most important function of these 
institutions is not the specific production of consensus-statements nor other inputs to the 
policy-process, but their embodiment and performance of an important nation-forming 
political ideal. Denmark is the land of folkelig debate where decisions are taken in common 
from a perspective of the common good. Danes dare question expertise and believe that 
ordinary (lay) people are the best to make decisions about the life to live in common.  
This argument, however, also points us to one of the more problematic or challenging 
aspects of the Danish participatory governance of science and technology. The 2002 near-
closure of the Board of Technology came after an (in)famous New Year’s speech by the 
prime minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in charge of the recently elected right-wing 
(conservative and neo-liberal) government. Rasmussen called for a 'confrontation [or 
showdown] with the arbiters of taste' and said the new government intended to close a 
number of expert committees across a broad range of policy advice areas.  
Many of them have evolved into state authorised arbiters of taste, who decide 
what is good and right in different areas. There are tendencies towards a 
tyranny of experts, which threatens to oppress the free folkelig debate. The 
public should not have to submit to raised fingers from so-called experts who 
think they know best. (Rasmussen, 2002) 
The prime-minister’s speech turned out to launch an extended effort to reduce the 
influence of ‘experts’ in political decision-making, and a list of committees to be closed was 
released three weeks later. Surprisingly, this list originally included the Board of 
Technology. Thus, even a Board that defined itself as being anti-elite and pro-citizen could 
find itself vulnerable to the accusation that it was getting in the way of free and ‘folkelig’ 
discussion. In general, this political move resonated well with the strong sense of anti-
elitism which is an immanent part of Grundtvigian ideals, although the Board was an 
unexpected target for this attack. Subsequent developments in Danish politics have 
demonstrated the strength of this anti-elitist aspect of Danish culture. The ‘other side’ of 
the strong deliberative culture is therefore a willingness to question scientific expertise and 
an explicit tendency to disregard expert advice – a tendency that has not diminished in 
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recent years. In an egalitarian culture like Denmark’s, nobody should think they are 
‘anything special’,4 and experts in particular are routinely reminded that they should not 
think their arguments are more important than anybody else’s. This point applies just as 
much to ‘experts in deliberation’ as it does to scientific and humanistic expertise.  
On the basis of the Danish case, we now seek to broaden the discussion in two ways. 
First, we will consider some immediate aspects of consensusing in the Danish setting. 
Second, we will tentatively place consensusing in a wider European context. 
 
Consensusing as Political Ideal 
A number of important points about the nature of consensus and consensusing can be 
drawn from this brief discussion of the Danish case. The first, and perhaps clearest, of 
these is that ‘the expectation of consensus’ is not – at least in this influential example – 
simply the absence of politics, denial of disagreement, avoidance of polarised points of 
view or the governmental putting of the nation ‘at ease’. Instead, and as the short 
excursion into Grundtvig’s social philosophy demonstrates, consensus in this case reflects 
a very particular set of political ideals. Importantly for the current discussion, and for the 
comparison with developments in other countries, these ideals incorporate a scepticism 
concerning ‘elite’ knowledge, including scientific and technological knowledges. Other 
elements include a faith in both the ‘common good’ and the ‘common person’, a 
commitment to a shared national culture, and a willingness to engage in open and critical 
debate. However attractive (or otherwise) these ideals might be, they reflect an ideological 
orientation and a corresponding set of values that together constitute a very particular 
setting for the formation of consensus.  
Consensusing as a way of thinking and acting is deeply intermingled and embedded in the 
general political culture and context in Denmark. It cannot, therefore, be evaluated simply 
according to its ability to achieve short-term political results. Instead, the Danish case 
demonstrates how consensusing as process in itself should be considered an important 
substance of political culture. This has broad implications for the wider external 
enthusiasm for deliberation and engagement in science and technology policy. It cautions 
us especially against expecting that deliberation can be used instrumentally as a  tool to 
establish an immediate policy-relevant consensus. In fact, over-rigid expectations might 
lead to disappointment of the very sort we are seeing right now among policy-makers and 
others in countries when the instrumental goal is not delivered (for discussion, see Wynne 
2005; Felt & Wynne, 2007).  
One further implication of our case study is that ‘cross-cultural borrowing’ of this 
governance framework (or elements thereof) is likely to raise many new questions and 
challenges. This point seems especially relevant when nations with a separate political 
culture attempt to graft consensusing onto their existing processes of scientific 
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governance. The Danish development of consensus conferences reflects a much broader 
political and social philosophy embracing many areas of national activity. This includes 
business and commerce, where there has been much discussion of a ‘Danish model’ 
based on flat management structures, high levels of taxation, financial security and flexible 
employment (what has become known as the ‘flexicurity’ model: see, for example, 
MacCarthy & Schmidt, 2006). The enthusiasm in other countries for the 
consensual/cooperative approach has characteristically been much more restricted in 
scope – and typically views the ‘consensus conference’ as an entity (or social technology) 
in itself rather than one component within a larger frame of governing. This is not to say 
that consensus conferences cannot be meaningfully organised outside Denmark, but that 
they should not simply be understood as a bounded technology (or part of the governance 
toolkit), to be imported with as little contextualisation as possible. 
It is especially relevant to consider the construction of the ‘layperson’ within societal 
debate and policy formation. In the Grundtvigian context, the ‘layperson’ is specifically 
defined and given specific standing. Assisted by dialogical enlightenment in the ‘school for 
life’, the layperson can tap into a wider sense of community and collective well-being than 
the narrower experts. The layperson therefore has unique access to a perspective of the 
common good, which the expert, qua her allegiance to a specific field of knowledge, can 
never embody. In this way, ‘laypeople’ are not viewed as tabulae rasae, as disinterested or 
‘innocent’ of the issues (Irwin, 2001), but as the very embodiment of knowledge about the 
practical world. The sense of belonging to a nation-state is – at least in the Grundtvigian 
model – an important precondition for this construction since it builds on a sense of shared 
culture and language which enacts a ‘we’ that can be drawn upon in deliberation, rather 
than a ‘we’ that would have to be constructed from scratch within the process of 
deliberation. This observation suggests the difficulty of bringing in the ‘layperson’ in 
conditions where no shared identity or shared purpose is on offer. Put more analytically, 
the crucial issue might be how a shared ‘we’ is constructed within different forms of 
deliberative encounter, a point which applies in the Danish context, but equally elsewhere. 
Our next point follows closely from this construction of the layperson. Equality in the 
distribution of knowledges provides a foundation for deliberation in the Grundtvigian 
model. Within one standard representation of the consensus conference, there is a 
fundamental assumption that laypeople have something important to contribute to 
consensus formation. In particular, they offer a common or holistic perspective. However, 
these notions can in turn be closely linked to an anti-elitism that poses a potential threat to 
scientific and expert authority, challenging (and even dismissing) such expertise as partial 
and based on possibly illegitimate interests. The point here is that deliberation is often 
advocated internationally without any sensitivity or even consideration over what should 
count as legitimate knowledge or ‘standing’ within such encounters (Collins & Evans, 
2002). Put differently, Danish-style deliberation is not without its problems for those 
committed to both the democratization of science and technology, and also the 
maintenance of some scientific foundation for public decision-making. In another version of 
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this observation, we have seen that ‘democratic’ institutions such as the Board of 
Technology can themselves come under fire for their alleged elitist and expert status. 
Our final point in this section is that, even in the Danish context, these notions of 
consensus, compromise and negotiation are now under severe scrutiny and challenge, 
partly as a consequence of globalising forces within Denmark. Thus, the notion of 
consensusing based on a shared and homogeneous understanding can appear defensive, 
exclusionary and even reactionary when viewed from other cultural and ethnic 
perspectives. Even in the specific case of consensus conferences, pervasive doubts have 
been expressed about the value of such exercises – and especially in terms of their policy 
relevance and impact (Seifert, 2006). These criticisms serve to reinforce the wider 
observation that the enactment of consensual principles depends not simply on 
appropriate institutional mechanisms but also on the larger political and ideological setting. 
It has to be recognised, too, that issues of science and technology governance do not 
currently hold a prominent place on the Danish political agenda; they have been replaced 
(perhaps temporarily) by other concerns over national identity, such as the societal 
consequences of globalisation in general, and immigration from non-Western countries in 
particular. 
 
Consensus in Wider Context 
We have so far presented consensusing as a broad phenomenon which is both performed 
within certain frameworks of meaning and performative in terms of generating shared 
identities and understandings (especially in relation to conceptions of ‘the nation’). As we 
have suggested, this analysis appears appropriate to the Danish case where Grundtvigian 
ideals of nation-building have played an important role in the establishment and practice of 
bodies such as the Danish Board of Technology. The question that now arises is whether 
Denmark is entirely unique in this relationship between consensusing and political culture. 
Can we identify other, perhaps very different, forms of identity formation in different 
national and international settings? 
Certainly, deliberation and engagement have become part of the standard vocabulary in 
policy documents dealing with the governance of science and technology in many 
European countries, as well as in the European Union itself (Felt & Wynne, 2007). If we 
return to Tony Blair’s evocation of a nation at ease with radical knowledge, it is not hard to 
identify a very particular sense of national identity being created: a nation which has not 
‘gone soft’ on science, a nation that can still lead the world (despite the threat from fast-
developing nations such as India), a nation which can still be ‘pragmatic’ and ‘evidence-
based’ without losing confidence and faith ‘in the face of the unknown’.  British 
expectations were more recently restated in a consultation document, ‘A vision for science 
and society’: 'The benefit of dialogue is that it allows the scientific community to be open to 
a continuous discussion of values and purposes, and is sensitive to these when 
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developing avenues of investigation. There is now a strong consensus in support of this 
approach as an important beneficial style of public engagement'  (DIUS, 2008: 11).  
Although the intellectual foundations of this broad approach are significantly less coherent  
-- and certainly less historically-specific -- than in the Danish context, we would argue that 
they are nevertheless significant and worthy of further exploration. It is especially relevant 
to consider how the instrumentalist notion that dialogue will facilitate scientific progress is 
being brought together with the nation-building ideal that this will unite British society in a 
progressive vision of the future. However, the important point must immediately be made 
that instrumentalism is a form of identity-building and not simply its opposite: presented in 
that way, instrumentality is also an enactment of political culture. The point here is not to 
dismiss British efforts because they fail to match Grundtvigian expectations. Rather, and 
perhaps inspired by the discussion of one small nation, we need to explore the manner in 
which British approaches to dialogue and consensus are simultaneously a performance 
and embodiment of specific future imaginations. Of course, as in all such comparative 
discussions, we need to beware the obvious dangers of presenting, Denmark, Britain or 
any other nation as being homogeneous and singular in its activities.  
Viewed in policy terms, it is certainly relevant to ask whether a managed approach to 
societal attitudes to innovation is likely to succeed even in its own terms. The British 
RS/RAE working group on nanotechnology appears to have been positive about the 
principle of enhanced engagement but understandably reluctant to endorse any particular 
course of practical action. The notion that even the most successful upstream engagement 
will serve to dampen subsequent social controversy seems questionable. However, rather 
than letting these observations lead us along the road to accusations of ‘false consensus’ 
(or suggesting that Grundtvigian ideals offer a route to ‘true’ consensusing), we would 
argue that it is more fruitful to observe and explore the performativity of all these calls for 
dialogue.  
Such an analysis is especially appropriate at the European level where it is possible to 
discern an institutional construction of Europe as a place where science and consensusing 
come together in a powerful vision of the future. One significant example is the 2002 
Science and Society Action Plan in which the European Commission called for a ‘new 
partnership’ between science and society, stating that 'Science activities need to centre 
around the needs and aspirations of Europe’s citizens to a greater degree than at present' 
(CEC, 2002: 7) and that '[a] true dialogue must therefore be instituted between science 
and society' (p. 14). Subsequently, the Action Plan has led to a number of activities, 
including the launch of a European Commission Science and Society portal. According to 
this official webpage:  
The European Commission has a duty to create the conditions for structured 
dialogue on science-related matters. The aim is to anticipate and clarify 
people’s hopes and concerns. With an informed and engaged Public, science 
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can fully play its crucial role in boosting competitiveness, enhancing our 
quality of life and ensuring a sustainable future (EC Science and Society 
portal, 2007).  
Building upon our discussion of Grundtvig in nineteenth century Denmark, we can 
hypothesize that the contemporary search for consensus around social, scientific and 
technological futures represents a form of institution- and nation-building across Western 
Europe. Both the European Commission and the UK Department of Innovation, 
Universities and Skills seem to share Grundtvig’s expectation of a new political identity 
built through consensus. While this new European identity may at times suggest a 
decidedly passive and centrally-managed representation of the scientific citizen, it also 
offers a powerful representation of the nation and the Europe of the future as a place in 
which scientific and technological innovation is intricately linked with ‘people’s hopes and 
concerns’ in order to generate industrial competitiveness, a dynamic social order and 
widespread prosperity. 
Whilst this vision is generally offered in positive terms, it can also be found in a more 
negative, and indeed more threatening, form. Thus, one report from 2006 offered the 
picture of a Europe steadily slipping into decline unless it could embrace the globalised 
future: ‘Europe must break out of structures and expectations established in the post-WW2 
era which leave it today living a moderately comfortable life on slowly declining capital. 
This society, averse to risk and reluctant to change, is in itself alarming but it is also 
unsustainable in the face of rising competition from other parts of the world’ (European 
Commision, 2006: 1). Just as the Danish model of consensusing was built both upon a 
positive nation-building philosophy and a sense of threat to national integrity, Europe also 
needs to find new ways of imagining its future if it is to prosper and, indeed, survive. 
It can plausibly be argued (Hagendijk et al. 2005) that a ‘market’ discourse is currently 
gaining strength within the governance of science and technology in Europe (including in 
Denmark), but we do not think that this should be interpreted simply as a power struggle 
between an innovation agenda and a deliberative agenda. As was also observed in the 
STAGE research programme (Horst et al. 2007), we would rather suggest that there is 
something distinctly European about the simultaneous institutionalisation of the discourses 
of innovation and deliberation. Following this, and from the point of view of the 
performativity of consensusing, we could suggest that the innovation agenda and the 
deliberative agenda, rather than being opposed to one another, might instead be closely 
interlinked in this emergent formulation: innovation can only function fully when it is based 
upon people’s hopes and concerns, and the public itself benefits from being enlightened 
about science and technological innovation. As a 2009 European report on the ‘Global 
Governance of Science’ put this: ‘Instead of seeing Europe’s progress towards a more 
democratic governance of science as a barrier to our success in the global knowledge 
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economy, we should consider how it might become a different form of advantage, opening 
up new opportunities for innovation’ (European Commission, 2009: 38). 
Although the current European enthusiasm for shared identity-building is not restricted to 
matters of science and technology, there does seem to have been a particular emphasis 
on consensusing across European scientific and policy institutions. Put more 
hypothetically, the paradigm of enlightenment through science and deliberation can be 
seen to foster an immanent anticipation that agreement or consensus will follow. The 
presented link between science, informed debate and rationality thereby offers a 
potentially solid foundation for consensus-expectation within science policy. On this basis 
also, Europe becomes the place where societal consensus provides a platform for social 
and technological innovation – a place of enlightenment in both scientific and political 
terms. 
Grundtvig’s Marxist critics were eager to point out that notions of folkelig democracy and 
civic responsibility took little account of the changing economic and industrial structure of 
Danish society. A similar observation can be made with regard to talk of consensusing in 
contemporary Europe. There is certainly something striking about the recurrent notion of a 
science-society partnership in which ‘science’ and ‘the public’ are the main two 
contributors (with policy-makers apparently taking the role of scene-setter and arbitrator). 
Talk of partnership therefore is also significant in terms of who (and what) gets constituted 
as a partner – with the role and influence of industrial organisations, although very present 
within the innovation agenda, largely absent within discourses and performances of 
consensus.  
 
Far from indicating the absence of politics, therefore, consensusing might be in demand 
within contemporary Europe due to its very capacity for shaping the political future. In so 
doing, it promises a more inclusionary form of governance. Simultaneously, it offers a 
challenge to experts and expertise – opening up who can count as experts, and the 
evaluative standards for judging expertise. Nevertheless, and as Mouffe would point out, it 
also excludes. For Wynne, talk of consensus characteristically obfuscates more 
fundamental cultural, political and epistemological questions. We would suggest that as a 
topic for social analysis we should investigate the performativity of consensus governance 
in a way that is less about endpoints than it is about process and less about making 
explicit policies based on consensus than about identity-formation in a broader political 
context. When exploring the nature of consensus, the central issue thus shifts from who 
controls what resources to who participates in the process, and on what terms. In this, 
adversarial and consensual politics may have more similarities than differences. 
Meanwhile, the point must be made that consensusing functions both as a democratic 





Our discussion has attempted to present consensus-expectation in new perspective. We 
argued that the ideals and expectations of consensusing can be more important than the 
final product, and that they need to be evaluated as such. We linked consensusing to 
aspirations of nation-building in Denmark and suggested that a similar analysis at the 
European level would be fruitful. The double commitment to innovation and deliberation 
may be what makes current European governance of science and technology distinctive 
(even if also problematic). We also emphasized the contextual character of consensusing 
so that the internationally applauded ‘Danish-style’ consensus conferences are generally 
quite remote from the current (and previous) practice in Denmark itself.  
 
Our perspective implies that the international export of one form of consensusing is likely 
to create fresh hybridities and performativities – not simply ‘false’ consensusing, but new 
forms of identity-creation with their own roots and aspirations. We have seen in the Danish 
case that consensusing can be fragile and open to accusations of betraying folkelig ideals. 
However, we would also suggest that such accusations of false consensusing represent a 
resource and a means of breathing life into consensual ideals (even if the short-term 
consequences may be politically unpalatable). Once again, consensus is presented not as 
an outcome but as a process: not, in Grundtvig’s terms, as ‘dead’ knowledge but as a 
living entity. We have suggested, too, that folkelig ideals raise special challenges for 
knowledge and expertise – including the knowledge and expertise possessed by those 
who seek to democratize science and technology. These challenges are rarely discussed 
directly by scientific institutions eager to establish consensus as a foundation for 
innovation.  
 
Being ‘at ease’ may be desirable from certain institutional viewpoints but carries obvious 
political risks. However, the provocation in this paper is less to particular forms of 
consensusing (false or otherwise), than to the wider consensus ideal when employed as a 
means of closing down complexity, building collective identity and reducing social 
opposition. Certainly, consensusing carries special dangers once it becomes removed 
from contestation, impervious to shifting knowledges and understandings, and sheltered 
from creative destruction. Given the close link between consensusing and nation-building, 
the normative question leads us to the kinds of nations we wish to build and the political 
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1 This is not to suggest that the Board has been without wider influence across its large range of activities. 
2 In 2005 a Danish newspaper published 10 cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammed. This led to protests 
across the Muslim world which escalated into violence and fires in Danish embassies. 
3 All quotes from Danish sources have been translated by the authors. 
4 This particular phrasing refers to a Danish phenomenon known as ‘the Jante Law’. It originates from a novel 
by Axel Sandemose (1994 [1933]) about the boy Jante, but has evolved into a cognitive institution, to which 
most Danes will make references when speaking about their culture with non-Danes. It consists of nine 
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